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Introduction 
This paper deals with the neglected question of the actual practice of political representation at 
the European level. In the context of the European Union (EU), the Parliament (EP) is the single 
directly popularly elected institution. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) hold a 
unique role in being the direct linkages between citizens and the EU institutions. Scholars’ 
interest for the functioning of the EP is thus significant and growing; following the evolution 
and the increasing visibility of the EP. On the one hand, this interest leads to a better knowledge 
of what happens inside the EP (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2007). However, scholars do not focus 
on the MEPs activities outside the EP (Farrell & Scully, 2010). Hence, despite the critical 
position of the EP in the process of political representation at the European level, scholars know 
only a little about the practices of the agents of representation. 
Going outside the EP for investigating district work is not only important because of the key 
roles of MEPs in the representation process. District work and non-legislative tasks are 
becoming more visible at both the national and supranational levels following global trends. 
Since the end of the Cold War, literature highlights the transformation of European 
representative democracies characterized by the growing distrust in political institutions that do 
not spare the EP. The 2008 financial crisis reinforced the feeling of distrust in politics, 
particularly in southern Europe (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). The linkages between citizens and 
political actors have become more salient, and citizens more demanding towards their 
representatives (Andre, Depauw, & Beyens, 2015). However, despite the work of Eulau and 
Karps (1977), until recently scholars adopted a restrictive definition of political representation, 
limiting the capacity to assess the direct link between citizens and MPs. This restriction finds 
its origin in the seminal theoretical work of Pitkin (1972). Representation is associated with 
policy congruence (Eulau & Karps, 1977); citizens are evaluating their representatives in terms 
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of policy similarity. It leads to an overestimation of the power of the parties in the process of 
political representation; Literature considers MPs as agents respecting the party discipline 
(Converse & Pierce, 1986) and to the omission of activities taking place outside the 
parliamentary chambers (Thomassen & Andeweg, 2004). Hence, despite it being an essential 
element of accountability, constituency service is largely ignored by scholars investigating the 
practice representation. At the European level, there is virtually no study about constituency 
work except a Ph.D. dissertation (Tomkova, 2014). Hence, this paper contributes to a better 
knowledge of both the political representation at the European level and of the consequences 
on Members of Parliaments’ behavior of the evolution of citizens’ demands. 
Mobilizing ethnographic data, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the actual practice of 
political representation on the ground through the observation of French MEPs’ activities in 
their district. According to Fenno (1978), to understand representative democracy in action, it 
requires to look not only at what is happening in the chamber but also to go beyond the walls 
of the Parliament, in the district: What do MEPs do in their districts? By investigating MEPs 
constituency work, this paper offers a new perspective on the debate about the democratic 
deficit of the EU (Moravcsik, 2002; Rittberger, 2003). It could challenge the traditional vision 
of MEPs disconnected from their electoral bases that would lead to a rareness of contacts 
between MEPs and their constituents (Clark & Rohrschneider, 2009; van der Eijk & Franklin, 
1991). Hence, if this paper focuses on a particular part of MEPs’ activities, it must be linked to 
the literature about parliamentary democracy at the European level. 
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Constituency representation at the European level: State of the art 
The process of political representation at the European level is debated through the question of 
a democratic deficit in the EU. Until last decades, the voluminous theoretical literature focusing 
on this issue contrasts with a lack of empirical investigations (Schmitt & Thomassen, 1999). 
EU is particularly outstanding for understanding the multi-dimensionality and dynamic nature 
(Pitkin, 1972) of political representation. MEPs, coming from diverse national polities and they 
are under pressure from various national interests’ groups. They interact each other and are 
subject to the multiplicity of institutional constraints. It leads to the multiplicity of allegiances 
and a sophisticated prioritization (Costa, 2002). Several authors investigate these allegiances 
focusing on diverse aspects of MEPs representational roles. The most common 
operationalization is related to the functionalist conception of representation (Wahlke, Eulau, 
& Buchanan, 1962) namely the focus and style of representation. According to Katz (1997), 
MEPs are more or less oriented toward the representation of national interest, European 
priorities, and constituency interests. However, the differences between MEPs and the 
determinants of the foci are not explained. The same limit can be addressed to Wessels (1999). 
Afterwards, Scully and Farrell (2003) find four discriminant factors: importance accorded to 
the representation of national party (voters); social group representation; representation of 
broad interests (national or European) and importance is given to the parliamentary activities. 
They show that MEPs prioritize they activities giving more importance to a particular 
“principal” (Scully & Farrell, 2003). They also tried to explain differences in how MEPs 
perceive their role but they failed to provide robust results, as they recognized themselves 
(Scully & Farrell, 2003). Brack and Costa (2013) detail the situation of French MEPs showing 
that focus of representation depends mainly on political orientations. They also show the 
difficulties in importing local issues into the EP due to institutional constraints. 
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These studies provide an interesting picture of MEPs’ complex set of attitudes, but the link with 
their activities and behaviors remains unrecognized. This critic is addressed to the functionalist 
approach and not only to its application to MEPs. As an answer to this limit, Beauvallet and 
Michon (2007) illustrate the local dimensions of MEPs’ behavior. They show that local ties are 
not sufficient to run for EP seats which depend mainly on political parties. Within the EP, 
institutional constraints limit the possibility to import local issues, but opportunities are set up 
by MEPs sharing common interests (Costa, 2001). 
Other scholars provide similar results by analyzing parliamentary questions (Proksch & Slapin, 
2011; Raunio, 1996). National opposition parties often use parliamentary questions at the 
European level as an alternative source of information (Proksch & Slapin, 2011, p. 72). Also, 
Costa and Brack (2014) did not find a systematic use of written questions to import local issues 
at the EP. The focus is mainly European. However, the authors note that Eurosceptic MEPs 
concentrate more on local and national issues than their colleagues. 
As a result, the time spent for the district is rather short, and MEPs appear to be more influenced 
by their party membership and their opinion about European integration (Hix et al., 2007). 
However, scholars mainly focus on the work inside the EP when, as argued by Fenno (1978), 
parliamentary work cannot be correctly analyzed without taking into account the work outside 
the Parliament. Legislative work and district work are two sides of the same coin. Scholars 
overlook this part of MEPs work despite its institutionalization (turquoise weeks may be 
dedicated to district work). 
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Hence, the literature gives various incentives to explore MEPs district work. The institutional 
constraints limit the possibilities to take advantage of parliamentary instruments to offer 
constituency service. To assure a connection with their constituents, they must work differently, 
and activities in the district can be one solution. In France, this pattern is observed at the national 
level. The literature considers the weakness of the house as a key element explaining why MPs 
focus more on district work than on their legislative tasks (Costa & Kerrouche, 2009; Costa & 
Poyet, 2016). Also, the institution itself incites MEPs to spend time in their district by 
organizing weeks that can be dedicated to district work (but not only). Despite this double 
incentive and a real interest in the question of parliamentary representation at the European 
level, the literature surprisingly neglected this aspect of MEPs work. The purpose of this article 
is thus to fill this gap by investigating the day-to-day contacts between MEPs and their 
constituents. 
French MEPs district work: Theoretical expectations 
Before presenting the hypotheses about MEPs district work, the first section discusses the 
factors inciting MEPs to develop ties in their district. The assumption is that MEPs are not 
subject to the same incentives than MPs and that this difference will lead to a different practice 
of district work.  
Incentives to offer constituency service 
The literature considers that district work is an answer to an electoral incentive. MPs spend time 
in their constituency to develop their reputation that can be translated into an electoral resource 
(Carey & Shugart, 1995). The European elections are regionalized, and the system differs from 
one member-state to another even if the proportional base is present in all countries. In France, 
the electoral system for European elections is proportional with closed-list and large district 
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magnitude. Hence, this system does not give incentives for cultivating personal vote and, thus, 
to spend time in the district (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Dudzinska, Poyet, Costa, & Wessels, 
2015). However, when the number of parties is high, candidates, mainly seniors, and 
frontbenchers, are invited by their party to develop ties in their districts. The gain is, thus, not 
individual but collective (Uslaner, 1985). Also, European Parliament might be considered by 
politicians as a step before running for local or national elections (Scarrow, 1997; van Geffen, 
2016). In France, other elections require strong local ties regardless the level of governance. 
Hence, MEPs may find a strategic incentive for spending time in the district (Høyland, Hobolt, 
& Hix, 2017). 
In addition to the career factors, the institutional design is a constraint that limits the possibility 
to import local issues in the EP; constituency work may be an answer to the lack of democratic 
legitimacy of the EP. Hence, it can increase MEPs responsiveness and legitimacy as well as, 
indirectly, the EP’s one (Costa, 2001). The institutional constraint inside the EP constitutes, 
thus, an opportunity for MEPs to develop local ties outside the chamber. More than being an 
answer to incentives from the electoral system, constituency service is a response to the 
weakness of the EP. If MEPs do not need to hunt personal votes for winning the next election, 
other incentives coexist and justify an exploration of constituency work. Moreover, since 
district work is dedicated to aiming other goals, it would be different from their national 
counterparts who must secure their reelection. 
French MEPs activities in their district: Research hypotheses 
Because of the lack of studies about MEPs district work, the theoretical expectations will be 
driven by studies investigating national MPs constituency activities as well as by an inductive 
reasoning. 
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In France, the primary activity in the district is casework namely when MPs take care of citizens 
individual issues (Costa & Poyet, 2016). As argued by Kerrouche (2009), MPs and their staff 
are considered as last chance administrative shelter for housing, working and financial 
problems. In the EP, Michon (2008) looks at the treatment of individuals’ solicitations by MEPs 
and their collaborators. He shows that individual issues (housing, employment) observed in 
MPs emails are not relevant here.  Also, Beauvallet and Michon (2007) show that MEPs spend 
time for casework, but the frequency of this activity remains overlooked. Two different 
expectations may occur: First, the irrelevance of individual issues might indicate that MEPs are 
not a last chance administrative shelter, neither inside the EP nor in their district. Second, it is 
also expected that individual issues are irrelevant in mails because they are processed in the 
district during specific appointments. However, this argument would be incorrect since the 
recent literature shows that casework is moving from meetings at politicians’ office to online 
demands (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013). Hence, the expectation is (H1): by contrast to 
national MPs, French MEPs will devote limited time for casework and surgeries. 
The second activity in the district is the social events. In these activities, which are mainly 
festive and commemorative, MPs are not solicited as they are for surgeries. Social events are 
strongly related to the seniority and experience of MPs. Norton and Wood (1990) argue that 
junior MPs have more incentives than the previous generation due to the stronger expectations 
of citizens. After a first period of “incumbency” during which MPs devote a considerable share 
of time in the constituency, MPs have only to maintain their electoral base (Fenno, 1978). Also, 
because of a lack of time, senior and high resourced MPs will not assure this presence 
themselves but through their collaborators and a professional communication (newsletter, 
media, and social networks). Social events are firstly symbolic since they allow the MPs to 
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show that they are members of the community composing the district (Eulau & Karps, 1977). 
MPs try thus to visit the different places of their district and to participate in a variety of events. 
Then, in the context of the EP, there is no objective reason to argue that MEPs will have 
different behavior. The hypothesis is thus: (H2) French MEPs devote much time in participating 
in social events. 
Third, maybe more important in the context of EP is the link with social and interests’ groups. 
In France, MPs contacts with these groups in the constituency are rather limited. These activities 
represent only 9% of the time spent in the district by French MPs (Costa & Poyet, 2016). In the 
case of the EP, the expectation is that these meetings are much more frequent than in the 
national context. Two reasons explain this expectation: first, interest groups and lobbying have 
a real and measured impact on MEPs preferences (Eising, 2007; Marshall, 2010). If this 
influence takes place mainly inside the EP, MEPs may also play the game in the district with 
local groups. Second, the EU may be a financial contributor for local projects integrating social 
groups like sports clubs or cultural organizations. Also, the same pattern is expected with 
political groups, parties, and local governments. The EU is also a provider of a financial fund 
designated to cities and regions. MEPs can play a moderator role between local administration 
and the EU. The local parties may also incite MEPs to provide this support to the municipalities 
they control. Hence, MEPs may play the role of moderator between these groups and the 
European administration. The role is not only to support for preparing an application. MEPs 
can then defend these requests. Unfortunately, the empirical design of this paper, focusing on 
district work, will not be able to appreciate the last step of the process. However, previous 
literature already highlighted these form of pork-barrel politics (Scholl, 1985). Hence, the third 
hypothesis is (H3) contacts with local and social and political groups are frequent in the 
district. 
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Finally, a top-down process may also occur when MEPs spend time in their district (Beauvallet 
& Michon, 2007). Top-down means all activities by which MEPs represent the parliamentary 
institution. In France, at the national level, this process is rather limited even if it exists. 
Information meetings are organized at on a regular basis by most of MPs (Costa & Poyet, 2016). 
At the European level, in a context of lack of legitimacy, it is expected that these activities are 
much more developed than at the national level: (H4) a high frequency of events like 
information meeting, visit school and visit to the industrial actors. 
Data and method 
The paper will use the data compiled in the IMPLOC project, coordinated by Olivier Costa and 
Jean-Benoit Pilet. Its ambition is to investigate the actual practice of representation through 
MPs’ and MEPs constituency work. The project adopts a comparative perspective mobilizing 
data from France and Belgium, but, here, only the French data are considered. Between 2012 
and 2013, 53 MPs (50) and MEPs (3) have been observed during two consecutive days when 
they are in their constituency. Since the empirical design is qualitative, the necessity of a robust 
representative sample is not required. However, the three selected MEPs are very different in 
terms of gender (two men and one woman), party membership (one member of the EPP, one of 
the ALDE and one of the S&D) and seniority (one MEP is a newcomer, one starts his second 
term, and the third was reelected three times). Concerning MEPs, the dataset compiles 21 events 
grouped in eleven categories. 
The qualitative methodological framework is double. It mobilizes moderate participant 
observation completed with an interview. Observation allows investigating the reality of the 
contacts with citizens. A systematic approach is adopted with the application of a strict protocol. 
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Observers fill a particular document for each event indicating its content. This approach has a 
double advantage: First, MEPs may adopt different behavior regarding the situation (Fenno, 
1978). By always evaluating MEPs behavior on the same precise criteria our sample can deal 
with this. Second, it facilitates the comparison between MEPs. The typology of events is based 
on previous studies about French and German MPs through the CITREP project (Costa & 
Poyet, 2016). Our hypotheses are based on these categories. For each event and each MEP, the 
observer describes the observation by pointing all interesting behavioral features of MEPs 
which cannot be added to the above document. The objective is also to retrieve all informal 
discussions between MEPs, their collaborators and other actors that cannot be considered as 
events. 
The interviews complete the observations. Their goal is to understand the opinion MEPs have 
about their work. The mixed-method approach using in this paper has one advantage: the mutual 
complementarity between the two methods. Observation allows the researchers to investigate 
the reality of constituency work, but the meaning of the activities remain hard to understand. 
On the other hand, scholars may understand the meaning given by MEPs to their activities. 
A comparison with French national MPs is provided in the tables and figure. It helps to highlight 
the specificity of MEPs district work. 
Empirical results 
Despite the heterogeneity of the activities, MEPs district work is rather homogeneous, and all 
MEPs organize their district work along the same line. Globally, the hypotheses find support. 
Overall, it appears that French MEPs district work is different to what it is observed at the 
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national level in France. The detailed analysis will highlight a practice of representation which 
is, to some degree, exclusive even if it does not seem this is intentional. 
MEPs as an insiders’ representatives 
Figure 1: Activities in the district 
Source: CITREP/IMPLOC projects. N=357. Numbers are percentages 
Figure 1 summarizes the type of events that were observed. The first result is the absence of 
appointments with citizens (for solving individual issues) when it is the most frequent activity 
among national MPs. Five reasons may explain this lack: First, the size of the district leads to 
a limited accessibility to the MEP. As observed at the national level, surgeries are not as 
frequent in large rural districts as they are in the small urban ones (Costa & Poyet, 2016). 
Compared to rural national constituencies, the districts for European elections are much bigger; 
leading to a stronger effect of this factor. Second, casework may take place outside the surgeries 
as, for example, during a visit to a firm. These decentralized surgeries are observed with an 
0
5
10
15
20
25
French MEPs French MPs
12 
MEP [S&D] visiting farms in her district. Farmers asked questions about the mechanisms of 
attribution of EU subventions. Finally, appointments with MEP’s collaborator are fixed. Third, 
surgeries become more-and-more virtual through social networks and emails since it is free and 
effortless (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013). The increasing number of emails received by 
MEPs is pointed by Michon (2008). The size of the districts might also reinforce this factor. 
However, this argument must be balanced: according to Michon (2008), each MEP receives, in 
average, about ten emails relative to individual issues every week. This number reaches a 
hundred or so for French MPs (Kerrouche, 2009). Fourth, collaborators may also directly 
manage these requests. Hence, citizens do not meet MEPs themselves even if the gain produced 
by “their” help would contribute to their reputation. However, These “practical” explanations 
which are rather common in the literature  (Kerrouche, 2009) are not relevant here or, at least, 
are not sufficient. A fifth explanation is given by MEPs who explain that Europe is far in the 
citizens’ considerations: 
They [citizens] are happy when I come to meet them, but the EP itself is far. It is a soil-less 
plant. […] They occasionally come to my office… However, anyway… Europe is far. If I 
would not be elected to an intercommunal council, if I would not be a basic activist, I guess 
they would not care. Really!  [ALDE, Man] 
“On a term, if I meet nearby let's say 15’000 people in total, that is the maximum. It has no 
tangible reality. The district itself has no tangible reality.” [ALDE, Man] 
As argued by Van Ingelgom (2014), a significant share of citizens is indifferent regarding the 
EU, and these sentences tend to show that this indifference also affects MEPs. MPs are a last-
chance administrative shelter (mainly to solve unemployment and housing issues), but MEPs 
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are not or, precisely, not in the same way. The observations show this is a shelter for initiated 
citizens. Those who have a matter with the European Union like the farmers introduced above. 
Hence, even is the MEPs’ office doors are open (rather all of them have at least one collaborator 
in the district), they are not a contact person in their district for individual matters. Informal 
talks with MEPs also highlight the relative indifference of citizens toward them. The observer 
spent two hours with one MEP in his office in the district for the interview and did not see 
anybody coming in the office while it was officially open. 
In line with the second hypothesis, Figure 1 shows that social events are the most frequent 
activities. The original definition of the events reflects their diversity. It can be a local 
celebration in a small town but also the opening of a new building (museum, library). They 
have a symbolic impact for MPs who can show to their constituents that they are members of 
the community. MPs try to go everywhere it is possible and to participate in every yearly event 
at least once a term. The first look on table one may give the impression that the pattern is 
similar for MEPs but a detailed look shows this not the case since the criterion of diversity is 
not met. 
MEPs did not attend any local events that are not related to the EU. Public apparitions of MEPs 
are observable only when the events have an European content. The events are the visit of the 
Village Européen – an annual event organized in one of the biggest city in the country –, a 
public speech about Europe during a debate hosted by an association just after the Village 
Européen, an active participation in an open conference about the monetary union and, finally, 
a questions and answers game following this conference played with students. The literature 
about MPs district work does not relate similar pattern among national MPs who are much more 
present to local events even if they are disconnected from their initial function. In the interviews, 
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the absence of MEPs of most of the local celebrations is not confirmed even if MEPs remain 
evasive: 
“There are many initiatives both political and associative, in every direction, where our 
presence may be required: in street demonstrations, colloquium or forum.” [EPP, Man] 
Beauvallet and Michon (2007) do not propose local-related social and festive events in their 
catalog. The observations confirm this point. MEPs do not participate in those events, and the 
empirical design cannot explain this. MEPs are observed in very different situations. For 
example, one stayed in the main city of the district when another was observed in a very rural 
part of her district. A third MEP was not focused on a part of his district but moved from one 
corner to another during the two days of observation. Hence, regarding the diversity of 
practices, if attendance in social events were a reality, it would have been observed. Also, the 
observers of national MPs do not relate the presence of MEPs during social events, even at the 
biggest ones. This result goes against the literature that emphasizes these symbolic activities 
not only for electoral purposes but also because they give the opportunity for MPs to examine 
the wills and the needs of their constituents. 
The situation of MEPs in their district may explain this result. Contrary to MPs, they are 
avoidable when a social event is organized; the capital gained with the presence of MEPs, for 
the organizer, is rather limited. The question of electoral gain for MEPs remains open, but if 
referring to the theory of personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 2013), such activities 
procure only limited advantages. According to Norris (2004), the electoral system makes MEPs 
accountable to their party and not directly to the voters. However, the explanation is not 
sufficient. In Germany, for example, some MPs are elected through a comparable electoral 
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system, but their participation to such of local celebrations is real and similar to French MPs 
practice (Costa & Siefken, 2014). MEPs themselves say that is important but difficult: 
“Everything is played out based on public existence in the sense of recognition. On public 
political existence. So of course, there is also political representation, but that is not enough 
either. Anyway, we always toiled, and we will toil again!” [Man, EPP] 
The results show that the indifference towards MEPs explains the different pattern. On the one 
hand, for the organizers of events, the presence of MEPs is not a promise of success. On the 
contrary, for the MEPs, participating in local events is not relevant since voters do not recognize 
most of them. 
Representing and importing Europe in the district 
The traditional explanatory patterns of district work do not apply for French MEPs. It does not 
mean that the view of district work as service and symbolic responsiveness (Eulau & Karps, 
1977) is not relevant but that these components of representative’s tasks are differently 
performed. There is a form of exclusivity which is not intentional. The secondary nature of the 
European mandate and the indifference of citizens towards MEPs lead to a very particular 
practice of political representation. MEPs are in contact with citizens interested in the EU and 
organize their district work relating to EU affairs. Hence, more than being a last-chance 
administrative shelter, French MEPs are the representative of the EU in their district. Only 
citizens and institutions that have a matter with the EU keep in touch with MEPs and vice versa. 
One MEP focuses on agriculture, and cattle/pig farms. These sectors have a considerable role 
in the local economy and directly and indirectly hire a significant share of workers. Also, they 
become increasingly dependent on the EU, mainly through the CAP. Similarly, free trade 
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agreements within the EU and between the EU and other countries affect these sectors (Carter 
& Smith, 2008). The observer notes that the goal of the visits was to learn more about the actual 
situation of the farmers and the consequence of EU policies. 
Beyond this illustration, the observations and interviews also show that contacts with social and 
political groups are frequent. MEPs are a contact-person to deal with EU matters not only for 
social groups but also and mainly for political groups: 
“I am obliged to reply here and there but primarily on European funding issues to meet their 
[associations and local political institutions] demands. I work a lot with the manager of the 
European funding systems in the city of [xzy1].” [Woman, S&D]  
The data also show that these meetings are not necessarily formal and do not take place in MEPs 
office but mainly during other events. For example, one party meeting was the opportunity to 
talk about various EU funding programs that may be useful to develop a public transportation 
system in an agglomeration of the district. The local representatives solicited the meeting, and 
it was the opportunity for the MEP to present what the EU can do for local communities. In a 
certain extent, a large part of district work is dedicated to assisting local groups and political 
institution in their matter with the EU. This task is applied in various types of events and not 
only in formal meetings as expected in the third hypothesis. This example also shows the role 
of the party as a platform allowing meetings between elected politicians even if it is not a 
necessary factor. More studies would be required, but the interviews and the observations tend 
to show that the party is a constant in meetings between MEPs and local politicians. MEPs tend 
to meet individuals sharing the same interests firstly: 
1 The second most important city in the district. The MEP was elected in this city before starting her career in the 
EP. 
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“On this topic, I usually prepare my votes with other MEPs, with the lobbies of the food 
industry… However, this time, also with citizens and the “Confédération Paysanne2, I spent 
two or three hours talking with four farmers who wanted to present me their opinion about my 
position. However, this is rare… Normally, the local, the district… We focus on specific 
topics, at a specific place.” [Man, ALDE] 
This result fits with previous literature. Michon (2008, p. 12) also shows that the treatment of 
demands from the civil society is dependent on the share of a common political network. MEPs 
tend to reserve a more positive answer to individuals they know. The proximity may not be 
only ideological, but this factor is important. 
More generally, the data portray a double process: First, there is a bottom-up practice of political 
representation: the district is a source of information (and local requests) for MEPs. However, 
according to the previous literature, this information is not directly processed in their legislative 
and control tasks to defend the interests of the district in a strict sense (Brack & Costa, 2013). 
Further studies are needed to know what extent district work may lead to specific requests 
directly to the Commission and other EU agencies; behind the closing doors of meeting rooms 
(pork-barrel politics). 
Second, there is a top-down process through a hard communication about the work in the EP. 
For example, an important farmers union organized a public meeting to allow a MEP to present 
her successes and failures on this issue. Also, the data show that MEPs are also used as a 
communication channel from the EU to the citizens and social groups. In a context of lack of 
2 A farmers syndicate 
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legitimacy, MEPs play the role of EU-spokesperson with the citizens. This teaching Europe 
role was variously observed: an interview by a graduate student, a visit to a school, speaker in 
a conference, etc. Most are initiated by the citizens or by local institutions and mainly by 
schools.  
In both processes, the EU is the main discussed issue (figures 2 and 3). It means that the MEPs 
are invited to talk about the EU and that MEPs organize their district work with a strong focus 
on EU matters. There are only two events where the EU was not mentioned namely a party 
meeting (at the time of the fieldwork, one MEP was a party leader) and a private meeting with 
former colleagues from the municipal council of a large city. At the national level, this strong 
connection between district work and political agenda is not observed. French MPs rarely evoke 
issues that are on the legislative agenda (Costa & Poyet, 2016). 
Figure 2: Average importance of political contents (1 to 5) 
Source: CITREP and IMPLOC projects. N=357. 
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Figure 3: The place of the EU in activities in the district 
Source: CITREP and IMPLOC projects. N=357. Numbers are percentages 
At least in France, MEPs are the representative of the EU in their districts. They do not take 
part in the cultural life of their district as national MPs do but are solicited when an event is 
“EU compatible.” As displayed in figure 3, the shape of the EU is observed during almost all 
(89.5 percent) activities. Similarly, they organize their work in the district about issues for 
which the EP are competent. They offer constituency service but only in limited policy areas 
while national MPs are solicited for problems for which the national parliament is not 
competent. In that respect, MEPs district work is distinct since they do not maintain strong ties 
with the whole constituents. If they bring their expertise when they are in the district, MEPs 
also bring Europe. It is a manner to become popular at the local level (and thus a credible 
potential candidate for a further election). More than a member of the community, MEPs is an 
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expert and become unavoidable thank to their abilities to import Europe at the local level and 
to assist specific constituents with EU-related queries. 
To sum up our results, three hypotheses on four find empirical support. According to the first 
assumption, French MEPs do not spend time for surgeries, but service may be offered during 
other activities. The second hypothesis is also verified with caution. MEPs are strongly involved 
in social events. However, they participate only to events having a link with Europe. MEPs do 
not take part in local celebrations as national MPs do. In that respect, it confirms previous 
studies (Tomkova, 2014). MEPs favor large invents instead of individual meetings with 
citizens. According to the fourth hypothesis, a large share of events is dedicated to the 
communication about MEPs work and EU functioning. They are frequently invited to talk about 
the EU. The third hypothesis does not meet a total support even if it is not rejected. MEPs help 
social and political groups, but it does not take place in formal meetings. 
Concluding remarks 
Scholars became increasingly interested in MEPs’ behavior but overlooked their activities in 
the district despite their importance for legislative work. The goal of this paper was to 
investigate MEPs day-to-day practice of political representation. 
The analyses suggest that MEPs district work is strongly connected to their European status. In 
their district, MEPs are the experts on European affairs more than members of the community. 
MEPs are moderators who facilitate the relationship between citizens and the EU. They are 
facilitators who can deal with the complexity of the EU. 
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For the debate about the democratic deficit of the EU, this paper brings a new perspective. 
District work is not disconnected from the parliamentary work and the traditional tasks of 
MEPs. It is both an input (information) and output (communication) for parliamentary tasks. 
The observations and the interviews suggest that MEPs do not suffer from a lack of legitimacy. 
Citizens who have a direct and strong matter with the EU can deal with MEPs. Also, MEPs are 
present to explain the work in the EP to the people. However, it remains a significant share of 
citizens who do not meet or even see their MEPs. In that respect, this article shows that even 
by taking district work into account, the democratic deficit of the EU is still a reality. Moreover, 
this article demonstrates that, to some degree, only citizens who are able or want to have contact 
with MEPs are represented when virtually all of them may have a matter with the EU. 
The question of the symbolic responsiveness of MEPs remains open. In the district, the contacts 
with citizens are nevertheless limited. MEPs are not invited to social events and do not seem to 
participate by themselves. Also, despite the presence of collaborators in the district, surgeries 
are not observed. Except for citizens having a particular matter with the EU, MEPs are not in 
contact with individuals as national MPs are. It means that district work does not compensate 
the lack of responsiveness observed during the sessions of the EP (or in the written questions). 
Ones would explain this result by the lack of electoral incites. Since the personal vote is scared 
in European elections, MEPs should not need to develop strong local ties. However, this 
argument does not find support in this paper since MEPs regret the lack of direct contacts with 
citizens. More probably, the citizen's indifference towards the EU creates a gap between MEPs 
expectations and citizens demands. One MEP says: 
“It [the EP] represents the citizens whatever they may be. I think it represents them fairly 
well. However, the citizens are not aware of this. Even sometimes we represent them so well 
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that we discuss things that I do not think we should consider because it is not in the public 
interest.” [Man, ALDE] 
Finally, the proper of responsiveness is the translation of citizens expectations into the 
representatives’ work. On that point, further studies are necessary since literature knows which 
tools MEPs do not use (parliamentary questions) for responsiveness towards the district 
purpose, the question of what MEPs concretely do with the information they gather from the 
district remains open. A detailed look at the work in committee may be necessary since the 
previous literature already showed the role of the district in the assignment process (Bowler & 
Farrell, 1995). 
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